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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, every 
conceivable government activity relating to the war on terror and 
the war in Iraq has been explored, analyzed, and criticized.1  One 
of the most elusive and effective tools in this war is covert action,2 
whereby the executive branch can take cloaked action and “fight 
the terrorists overseas so we do not have to face them here at 
home.”3  While the reasons for not disclosing the specifics of a 
covert action to the American public are obvious, the process used 
to initiate such actions can reasonably be held to a higher standard 
of transparency. 
Despite the existence of statutes and executive orders 
attempting to clarify the responsibility of the executive branch to 
disclose its plans for initiating a covert action,4 too much of the 
process remains in the shadows of bureaucracy.  None of the 
existing law provides an accurate picture of how the President, 
National Security Council (NSC), and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) come to a decision to engage in a covert action.  With whom 
did the Executive Branch consult when it proposed to send covert 
aid to influence the Iraq elections?5  Who gave the “go” order to 
launch an American Predator drone and fire a Hellfire missile on a 
group of Al Qaeda militants in Yemen that included an American 
citizen?6  What was the role of senior congressional leaders in 
determining whether such actions were aligned with the will of the 
American public? 
This article will assess the transparency and balance of the 
current administrative process in place for developing and 
executing a covert action.  This assessment is conducted in four 
parts.  First, the article presents the history of the evolution of 
                                                 
 1. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 200 (2004) 
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 2. See infra Part II.G. (stating the current definition of covert action in U.S. 
statute). 
 3. President George W. Bush, Address to the American Legion National 
Convention (Aug. 31, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/ 
08/20060831-1.html. 
 4. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a, 413b (2000); Exec. Order No. 12,333, 
46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 5. Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, Plan Called for Covert Aid in Iraq Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2005, at A6. 
 6. Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike, WASH. POST, Nov. 
8, 2002, at A1. 
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covert action in America from 1947 to the present.7  Second, this 
article reviews the processes used by recent administrations in 
approving covert action.8  Third, the article provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the process used by the current 
administration to approve covert activity by analyzing current 
trends and the execution of recent covert actions.9  Finally, changes 
to the current system are recommended to increase the 
transparency and oversight of the covert action process in the best 
interests of the American public.10 
II. HISTORY OF COVERT ACTION 
A. National Security Act of 1947 
The CIA was created, and covert action was first authorized by 
statute, through the National Security Act of 1947.11  The language 
of the act was widely understood to authorize the chief executive to 
approve covert actions at his discretion.12  While information on 
authorized covert actions was available to Congress after the 
passage of this act, few legislators showed an interest in covert 
activities or requested briefings regarding their implementation 
and execution until the 1970s.13  Most members of Congress 
believed that the conduct of secret actions was completely at the 
discretion of the President.14  Covert actions were primarily 
                                                 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Parts III.A–C. 
 9. See infra Part III.D. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).  The act stated that the CIA, under the direction 
of the NSC, had the duty to “perform such other functions and duties related to 
intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may 
from time to time direct.”  Id. § 403(d)(5).  The CIA was the successor to the 
Office of Strategic Services and other small, World War II-era intelligence 
organizations.  See also U.S. Department of State, National Security Act of 1947, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/17603.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2007). 
 12. W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACTION 118 
(1992).  It has also been argued that the authority for conducting covert action 
can be found in various statutes dealing with specific situations, such as the 
Hostage Act of 1868.  Id.  See also 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) (“[w]henever it is made 
known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly 
deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government . . . the 
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war . . . proper to obtain 
or effectuate the release”). 
 13. WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, EXECUTIVE SECRETS: COVERT ACTION AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 91 (2004). 
 14. Id. at 91–92. 
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understood to be programs aimed at preventing the spread of 
communism (in light of the Soviet threat), and Congress operated 
under the assumption that such actions would be conducted in a 
risk-minimizing manner.15 
B. Hughes-Ryan Amendment 
The landscape of congressional oversight of covert activities 
changed significantly in the 1970s.  In the wake of the Vietnam War 
and the Watergate scandal, combined with reports concerning the 
conduct in previous covert actions, general mistrust of the 
executive branch began to permeate American politics.16  Congress 
responded to the executive branch’s apparent abuse of power by 
passing, in 1974, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (Hughes-Ryan) to 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.17  Hughes-Ryan added 
significant parameters and checks on the process of approving 
covert action. 
First, the amendment added the express requirement that any 
covert action authorized by the President must be important to the 
national security of the United States.18 
Second, Hughes-Ryan attempted to significantly standardize 
the process of issuing a covert action order by requiring a 
“presidential finding.”19  A finding is a written document signed by 
the President describing a contemplated action and listing all 
governmental agencies and third parties to be involved.20  
                                                 
 15. Id. at 92. 
 16. Id. at 92–93. 
 17. 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982) (repealed 1991).   
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other 
Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence 
Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities 
intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until 
the President finds that each such operation is important to the 
national security of the United States.  Each such operation shall be 
considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity for the 
purpose of Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947. 
Id. 
 18. See supra note 17 (quoting Hughes-Ryan language).  See also AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, 
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES: AN 
EVALUATION 20 (1985) [hereinafter ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION]. 
 19. See supra note 17 (“unless and until the President finds”) (emphasis 
added). 
 20. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2000) (defining a finding, which is essentially the 
same as what was stated in Hughes-Ryan). 
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Information disclosed in the finding was to be “reported to the 
congressional intelligence committees as soon as possible.”21  While 
disclosure of information to Congress regarding covert actions 
became required through Hughes-Ryan, the statute explicitly 
excluded the report from being construed as a condition 
precedent to the President’s power to authorize covert activities.22  
The real control conveyed to Congress by the advent of the 
presidential finding was the creation of what amounted to a 
congressional veto.23  By receiving information on covert actions in 
advance of their execution (in most cases), Congress could execute 
veto power over actions they deemed inappropriate by exercising 
their constitutional right to approve or deny public funding for the 
proposed action.24 
Finally, Hughes-Ryan marked the practical end of presidential 
plausible deniability.25  Prior to the Amendment’s passage in 1974, 
presidents dating back to Harry S. Truman “sought to strictly limit 
the [executive branch’s] knowledge of covert action programs” so 
the U.S. government could plausibly deny any covert action that 
might be compromised or disclosed to the American public.26  This 
was perhaps the most pivotal change in the process governing 
covert action moving forward as a culture of deniability was 
replaced with a more formalized system of accountability. 
C. The Church Committee Report 
An extensive investigation of all United States intelligence 
agencies was conducted between 1975 and 1976 by the Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect 
to Intelligence Activities, known as the “Church Committee” after 
its chairman, Idaho Senator Frank Church.27  The committee’s final 
                                                 
 21. Id. § 413b(c)(1).  The Hughes-Ryan Amendment required a presidential 
finding to be reported to eight different congressional committees: 
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs Committees of both the 
House and Senate, as well as the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  Id. See also 
DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94. 
 22. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2) (2000) (“Nothing in [the Intelligence Oversight 
Act] shall be construed as requiring the approval of the congressional intelligence 
committees as a condition precedent.”) (emphasis added). 
 23. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 93–94. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The Church Committee published numerous reports during its tenure, 
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report was Volume 7, entitled “Covert Action.”28  The Church 
Committee expressed concern over the amount of legislative 
oversight involved in the approval of covert activities and 
recommended that a permanent committee be established to 
oversee the process.29  The Senate responded by creating the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.30  This committee was 
given full authority to oversee the intelligence activities of the U.S. 
and to authorize the appropriate funds.31 
The Church Committee’s findings led to a brief period of 
inactivity by the executive branch.  The Ford Administration’s 
covert action record is limited, based both on a reduced number of 
actions influenced by the Church Committee’s scrutiny, as well as 
the inconsequential nature of the actions that were undertaken.32  
The Church Committee’s report, combined with the changes 
implemented by Hughes-Ryan, led to a period of increased 
congressional oversight of the process for approving covert action.  
But that process would soon be limited by the next piece of 
intelligence legislation. 
D. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 
The process of authorizing covert action was streamlined 
through the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.33  This act reduced 
the number of congressional committees that the executive branch 
                                                                                                             
all produced during the 94th Congress of the United States.  The Assassination 
Archives and Research Center’s Public Library, Church Committee, http://www. 
aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) 
(publishing all fourteen released reports of the Church Committee).  The topics 
of the reports ranged from “Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Substances” (Volume 
1) to “Mail Opening” (Volume 4).  Id.  The Committee’s 7th volume was “Covert 
Action” and centered on the U.S.-influenced overthrow of Chile’s democratically 
elected socialist government in 1970.  S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976). 
 28. S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976). 
 29. ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 7–8. 
 30. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976) (enacted).  This committee is “composed 
of 15 members drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations 
and Judiciary Committees, and from the Senate at large.”  ABA INTELLIGENCE 
EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 8.  The House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence was not created until the 95th Congress and “consists of 16 members, 
with membership drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Affairs 
and Judiciary Committees, as well as the House at large.”  Id. See also H.R. Res. 658, 
95th Cong. (1977) (enacted). 
 31. ABA INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION, supra note 18, at 8. 
 32. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 178. 
 33. Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981–82 (codified at 50 U.S.C.    
§ 413 (1982)) (adding Title V to the National Security Act of 1947). 
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needed to contact with a presidential finding.34  Hughes-Ryan 
required that eight different congressional committees35 be 
contacted and the Act changed the requirement to include only 
the intelligence oversight committees.36  Presumably, this 
amendment to the covert action approval procedure reduced the 
ultimate number of Senators and Congressmen who were informed 
in advance of a covert action.  By limiting the number of people 
informed of the action, this amendment undoubtedly increased 
both the secrecy of the approved action and the speed and 
efficiency of the notification process. 
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 also changed the 
timeline under which the President needed to operate in notifying 
the congressional intelligence committees of the President’s intent 
to execute a covert action.  Under Hughes-Ryan, the President was 
required to inform Congress “in advance” of the execution of a 
covert action.37  The 1980 Act changed the requirement of 
disclosure to notification in a “timely fashion.”38  This “opaque 
phrase” was not further defined in the Act and was interpreted by 
some, including the Reagan Administration, as providing the 
President with unrestricted discretion in choosing when to inform 
Congress of a covert program.39 
This Act, and its application by the executive branch in the 
1980s, marked a brief departure from the trend of increased 
control by the legislative branch over covert activities. 
E. Executive Orders 12,036 and 12,333 
This shift away from increased congressional oversight of 
covert actions was also mirrored by a subtle change in the extent of 
executive branch oversight of “special activities.”40  In 1978, the 
Carter Administration issued Executive Order 12,036 to more 
accurately define the role of the executive branch and other 
                                                 
 34. Id. 
 35. See supra note 21 (listing eight congressional committees). 
 36. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 94.  The intelligence oversight committees 
are the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence.  Id. 
 37. Id. at 93–94. 
 38. Id. at 97. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,953–54 (Dec. 4, 1981); 
Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674, 3675 (Jan. 24, 1978) (repealed 1981) 
(both orders defined covert actions as “special activities”). 
7
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United States agencies in intelligence collection activities.41  In 
section 1-302, the 1978 order listed specifically those members of 
the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC) that were to be 
involved with all decisions concerning special activities.42  Included 
in this list of committee members were the Attorney General and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.43 
In 1981, the Reagan Administration issued Executive Order 
12,333.44  This order repealed Executive Order 12,036 and 
amended many of the procedures the Carter Administration had 
created.  Most noticeably, Executive Order 12,333 removed the 
specific listing of the members of the executive branch to be 
involved in committee decisions regarding special activity (i.e., 
covert action) policy.45  Instead of maintaining a specific committee 
containing specific members for handling such activities, the 
Reagan Administration simply designated to the NSC the power to 
“establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its 
functions and responsibilities” under the new order.46  By 
instituting this change, the NSC could effectively include or 
exclude anyone it chose from decisions and analysis of covert 
activities.  This change in the operation of the executive branch is 
also indicative of the prevailing trend at the time of limiting the 
amount of congressional oversight involved in the approval process 
of covert actions. 
F.  Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 
The fallout after the Iran-Contra Affair led Congress to 
reassert legislative control over covert action.47  The Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1988 more strictly reigned in the President’s need 
to communicate with Congress concerning proposed covert 
actions. 
As mentioned earlier, the Reagan Administration liberally 
                                                 
 41. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 3674. 
 42. When considering special activity policy initiatives, the SCC was to include 
“the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Director of Central Intelligence.”  Id. at 3675. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 45. See REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 120. 
 46. 46 Fed. Reg. at 59,942. 
 47. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 96–97. 
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construed the meaning of the “timely fashion” language in the 
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.48  This liberal use of the 
notification requirement resulted in a ten-month delay between 
President Reagan’s decision to sell arms to Iran in exchange for 
American hostages and the President’s notification to Congress 
that these activities had taken place.49 
In response to the Reagan administration’s ultimate use of 
discretion regarding congressional notification, Congress imposed 
a forty-eight-hour time limit for the President to notify Congress of 
a finding for covert activity.50  This finite hour requirement 
eliminated the “timely fashion” language and placed more pressure 
on the executive branch to communicate with Congress within the 
confines of a hard deadline.51  The forty-eight-hour requirement 
was a more restrictive policy for the executive branch to follow, but 
it did not eliminate the ability of the President to act in emergency 
situations to protect the national interest without congressional 
consultation.52 
G. Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 
The abuses committed by the executive branch in the Iran-
Contra affair led to Congress’s most significant modification of the 
authorization process for covert actions.  The Intelligence 
Authorization Act of 1991 (IAA of 1991) repealed Hughes-Ryan 
and amended the National Security Act of 1947, imposing more 
stringent requirements for the President to meet to execute a 
covert action plan.53 
Despite the legislation passed regarding covert action before 
1991, a statutory definition of covert action never reached U.S. 
                                                 
 48. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 49. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97.  
 50. Id.  The forty-eight-hour requirement was reluctantly supported by fellow 
Reagan Republicans such as Senator Arlen Specter (R–Pa.), who concluded that 
the practice of prior notice had not worked in the past.  Loch Johnson, Controlling 
the CIA: A Critique of Current Safeguards, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 394 (1989).  
But at the time the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1988 was passed, only four 
violations of the prior-notice requirement had actually occurred since the passage 
of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.  Id. at 395 n.138. 
 51. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Paul Gumina, Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991: 
Effective Covert Action Reform or “Business as Usual”?, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 149, 
177 (1993). 
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Code until passage of the 1991 Act.54  The IAA of 1991 defined 
covert action as: 
[A]n activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
publicly, but does not include— 
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to 
acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence 
activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain 
the operational security of United States Government 
programs, or administrative activities; 
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or 
routine support to such activities; 
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted 
by United States Government law enforcement 
agencies or routine support to such activities; or 
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt 
activities (other than activities described in paragraph 
(1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government 
agencies abroad.55 
The passage of this statutory definition created the 
requirement that the President comply with its provisions and align 
proposed covert actions within the legal and factual framework of 
the statute.56 
Unlike previous legislation, the IAA of 1991 created affirmative 
actions for the President to take before executing a covert action.57  
The affirmative requirements of Title VI58 were passed to 
                                                 
 54. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 123.  Before 1991, covert action was 
loosely defined through Executive Order No. 12,333 as “special activities,” which 
meant  
activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives 
abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United 
States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and 
functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to 
influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or 
media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and 
production of intelligence or related support functions.   
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,953–54 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 55. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000) (the statutory language passed in 1991 is 
identical to present language). 
 56. Gumina, supra note 53, at 181. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 amended Title V of 
the National Security Act of 1947.  Intelligence Authoritzation Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
10
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specifically address particular abuses that had arisen out of the 
Iran-Contra Affair.59  First, the IAA of 1991 required that the 
President “keep the congressional committees fully and currently 
informed of all covert actions.”60  Second, Title VI required that the 
President promptly inform the intelligence committees of any 
illegal intelligence activity and provide an explanation of corrective 
action taken to alleviate such illegal activity.61  Finally, the Act 
reaffirmed the Hughes-Ryan provision that a presidential finding 
for a covert action must be in writing.62  Under the Act, the finding 
was still subject to the forty-eight-hour reporting provision, 
providing for instances when circumstances may not allow for an 
advanced, published finding.63  An additional wrinkle was also 
added to ensure that these presidential findings did not function to 
authorize actions that had already occurred.64 
The passing of the IAA of 1991 solidified and expanded the 
shared powers arrangement enveloped in the original National 
Security Act of 1947 and the amendments that followed.65  Through 
passage of the IAA of 1991, the U.S. Government reasserted the 
requirement of legislative involvement and public representation in 
the approval of covert action.  Adequate safeguards were included 
to allow the Commander-in-Chief to make split-second decisions 
pivotal to the safety of the nation under his executive power,66 but 
                                                                                                             
No. 102-88, § 602, 105 Stat. 429, 441–44 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a, 413b 
(2000)). 
 59. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 97; Gumina, supra note 53, at 177. 
 60. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)(1) (2000).  This portion of the act was a response to 
the delinquency with which President Reagan had acted in informing anyone 
outside of the executive branch of the plan to trade arms with the Iranians in 
exchange for the release of American hostages.  See Gumina, supra note 53, at  
168–74 (recounting the specifics of the Iran-Contra Affair and subsequent 
executive cover-up). 
 61. Gumina, supra note 53, at 177.  The inclusion of this clause in the original 
act was at the recommendation of the Iran-Contra Committee.  See Senate Select 
Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran Contra Affair with 
Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, S. Rep. No. 216, H.R. Rep. No. 433, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Committee Report]. 
 62. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(1) (2000). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. § 413b(a)(2).  The elimination of post hoc authorization of covert 
actions by presidential finding was the result of a finding of the Iran-Contra 
Investigative Committee.  Iran-Contra Committee Report, supra note 61, at 424 
(Recommendation No. 7).  See also Gumina, supra note 53, at 178 n.182. 
 65. Gumina, supra note 53, at 183.  
 66. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(1) (2000) (stating that “[e]ach finding shall be in 
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the frustration inherent in past failures and abuses of power were 
affirmed in statutory language that increased the role of Congress 
in the execution of covert activity. 
III.  AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR COVERT ACTION 
The IAA of 1991 was the last piece of major legislation passed 
that significantly amended the process for authorizing and 
executing a covert action.67  As history has shown,68 the regulations 
passed via statute for approving covert action only provide a 
general framework under which the executive branch is to operate 
when determining how to carry out its plans for secretive, non-
military activity.  To decipher the more intricate process followed 
by the Commander-in-Chief, NSC, and CIA to execute a covert 
plan, it is necessary to investigate the procedures developed by past 
presidential administrations.  While it is difficult to uncover exactly 
what occurs behind the closed doors of the West Wing and CIA 
headquarters in Langley, Virginia, events transpiring under the 
watch of America’s four most recent presidents (and covered by 
journalists) have shed some light on the process leading to the 
execution of covert activity.69 
After a brief look back at the processes used by the Reagan, 
George H. W. Bush, and Clinton Administrations, this article will 
attempt to piece together a comprehensive picture of the process 
in place under the current George W. Bush presidency.  The events 
of September 11, 2001 and the war on terror have revitalized the 
use of covert action.  At the time of this writing, no thorough 
                                                                                                             
writing, unless immediate action by the United States is required and time does 
not permit the preparation of a written finding”); § 413b(c)(2) (limiting the 
number of people to be informed through a finding of a planned covert action if 
“extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States” exist). 
 67. All other amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 were minor 
changes in verbiage and had no significant effect on the operation of the statute.  
See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458,    
§ 1071(a)(1), 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (substituting “Director of National 
Intelligence” for “Director of Central Intelligence”); Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-306, § 353(b), 116 Stat. 2383, 2402 (2002) 
(striking “Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives” and replacing 
it with “congressional intelligence committees,” which is defined as). 
 68. See supra Part II. 
 69. Prominent journalists consistently covering the government’s activity in 
covert channels include Dana Priest (Washington Post), Douglas Jehl (New York 
Times), James Risen (New York Times), and Seymour M. Hersh (The New 
Yorker). 
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analysis of the process in place has been assembled in available 
legal literature. 
A. The Reagan Administration 
The advent of the presidential finding and other regulations 
mandated by Hughes-Ryan led to the institution of official, 
standardized, and specific processes for approving covert activities 
starting with the Carter Administration.70  A President could no 
longer deny knowledge of covert actions, necessitating a process of 
review by intelligence experts and other members of the 
President’s cabinet to ensure that actions undertaken would 
withstand possible future legal and social scrutiny.71 
The momentum generated through the covert action 
authorization process implemented by President Carter motivated 
the Reagan Administration to also formulate formal authorization 
measures.72  In 1985, National Security Decision Directive-159 
(NSDD-159), Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination 
Procedures, was passed, formally implementing the internal process 
adopted by the Reagan Administration.73  As has been the case 
since 1974, the President was the catalyst for starting the process of 
researching a proposed covert action.74  After the President’s 
request, the planning stages of the proposed action would pass 
through the White House’s Planning and Coordination Group 
(PCG)75 and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG).76  
Until the Iran-Contra Affair, the final execution order for a covert 
action plan could be given by either the President or a member of 
                                                 
 70. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 99; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND 
PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, 1977–1981, 59–63 (1983); 
Loch Johnson, Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America’s Secret 
Foreign Policy, 33 INT’L STUD. Q. 81, 97–98 (1989). 
 71. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 98–99.  
 72. Id. at 100. 
 73. Id. at 101.  This directive was implemented on January 18, 1985.  Id.  
NSDD’s are confidential documents, but certain of these directives have been 
declassified, at least in part. See Russell J. Bruemmer & Marshall H. Siverberg, The 
Impact of the Iran-Contra Matter on Congressional Oversight of the CIA, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 235 (1988) (providing an excerpted version of NSDD-286). 
 74. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 110–11. 
 75. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101.  The PCG, “which was composed of 
high-level representatives (often the deputies) from the Departments of State and 
Defense and other relevant agencies, was to review all covert action programs 
current and proposed.”  Id. 
 76. The NSPG was essentially the NSC and the heads of any other 
departments involved in the project.  Id. 
13
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the NSC staff.77  The abuses of Iran-Contra led to NSDD-286, 
Approval and Review of Special Activities, which eliminated the NSC’s 
participation in covert action operations and reserved the power to 
execute these activities in the hands of the CIA or another 
department empowered by the President in compliance with the 
National Security Act of 1947.78 
The Reagan Administration was the first to fully implement a 
formalized procedure, and that procedure is still very much in 
effect today.79 
B. The George H. W. Bush Administration 
As the successor to the Reagan Administration in which he 
served as Vice President,80 George H. W. Bush did little to change 
the process of approving covert action.  Bush essentially carried on 
the process created during the Reagan Administration and 
attempted to remove himself from the abuses of Iran-Contra.81  The 
end of the Cold War allowed President Bush to terminate many 
covert operations because the Soviet threat had subsided.82  The 
majority of the covert actions executed during this period remain 
classified and have not been officially acknowledged.83 
                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  See also 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2000).  The current statute reflects the 
codification of the covert action process by the IAA of 1991, and the statute has 
not since been amended.  Id. 
 79. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101.  The George H. W. Bush 
Administration followed the Reagan Administration’s model of approval almost 
exactly.  Id.  Only the names of the established committees were changed.  Id.  The 
PCG became the “Deputies Committee” and the NSPG became the “Principals 
Committee.” Id. 
 80. Bush served as Vice President to Ronald Reagan from 1981–1989 before 
winning the presidential election in 1988.  Biography of George H. W. Bush, THE 
WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gb41.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
 81. Bush testified during Iran-Contra investigations that he was “out of the 
loop” with regard to arms transactions with Iran, but that he did know that such 
transactions had occurred.  See Excerpts from the Iran-Contra Report: A Secret Foreign 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994, at A10 (reprinting excerpts from the final report 
by Independent Counsel for the Iran-Contra Affair, Lawrence E. Walsh). 
 82. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 216.  The number of presidential findings 
issued annually dropped from more than thirty to less than ten during the first 
Bush administration.  Id. 
 83. Id. 
14
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C. The Clinton Administration 
The Clinton presidency adopted many of the same procedures 
developed and followed by the Reagan and Bush Administrations, 
but continued to build on the process already in place by adding 
additional checks and balances to the approval process of covert 
actions.84 
All directives to generate proposals from the Clinton White 
House came from either President Clinton or the National Security 
Advisor.85  The request was then forwarded to CIA headquarters, 
where numerous internal reviews would take place, depending on 
the nature of the proposed action.86  During the CIA’s approval 
process, attorneys from the CIA’s Office of General Counsel 
(OGC) would review the proposed action at every step of its 
approval and address any legal issues that arose.87  After the 
proposal had been addressed (and amended as needed) by two 
high-level committees at the CIA,88 the proposed action plan would 
be given to the OGC for one final assessment of legal issues before 
being transferred back to the White House by either the Director 
of Central Intelligence or his deputy.89 
After the proposal returned to the White House, another 
                                                 
 84. See id. at 216–17; ROBERT M. GATES, FROM THE SHADOWS: THE ULTIMATE 
INSIDER’S STORY OF FIVE PRESIDENTS AND HOW THEY WON THE COLD WAR 379 (1996); 
Johnson, supra note 70, at 94–95.  Clinton formally adopted many of the existing 
approval procedures through Presidential Decision Directive-2, Organization of the 
National Security Council on January 20, 1993.  DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 216. 
 85. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 101.  Excluding the CIA, any executive 
agency with responsibilities in foreign policy or national security could suggest 
possible actions to the NSC, but only the President or National Security Director 
could set the CIA in motion to start the actual planning process.  Id. at 101–02. 
 86. See id. at 103–04.  The CIA would incorporate those operatives that would 
eventually be in charge of managing the execution of the proposed action, taking 
into account location, specific issues, and the possible need for department of 
defense assistance.  Id. at 103. 
 87. See id. at 103–05. 
 88. The two primary review groups in the CIA are the Covert Action Planning 
Group (CAPG) and the Covert Action Review Group (CARG).  See id. at 104.  The 
CAPG is defined as the top of the CIA’s “directorate” level; this committee refines 
the proposal based on operational concerns, cost-benefit analysis, the risk of 
failure, and other functional concerns.  Id.  The CARG does much of the same, 
but takes into consideration the reactions of Congress, more nuanced legal issues, 
and the compliance of the proposal with administration policy.  Id. at 105.  The 
CARG has been referred to as “the top echelon of CIA management.”  JEFFREY T. 
RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 431 (3d ed. 1995). 
 89. DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 105. 
15
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multi-layered review process would take place.90  The proposal was 
first analyzed by the Interagency Working Group for Covert Action 
(IWG), a collection of representatives from major executive branch 
agencies, who would review the major policy objectives, legality, 
and coordination of agencies needed to execute the planned 
action.91  After the IWG finished multiple screenings of the 
proposed action and finding, the proposal would move through 
the Deputies and Principals Committees for final approval.92  The 
proposed presidential finding and attached details were then sent 
to the President for his signature and passed on to Congress within 
the mandated forty-eight-hour period required by statute.93 
The process in the Clinton White House was regimented and 
relatively straightforward.  Great importance was placed on 
thorough analysis and the participation of all relevant agencies to 
the proposed action.94  At present, there appears to be no evidence 
alleging that this process was not followed for any particular action 
of record. 
D. George W. Bush and the Current Process 
Shortly after taking office in 2001, George W. Bush signed a 
presidential directive that retained the majority of the covert action 
approval process used by President Clinton.95  From the outset, it 
                                                 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 105–06.  The Clinton Administration followed the guideline passed 
in the Reagan administration’s NSDD-286 that required as many thirteen different 
agencies to participate in this planning process.  Id.  Included were representatives 
from the Department of State, Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Office of Management and Budget, CIA, and the Justice Department.  Id. at 106. 
 92. Id. at 106–07.  The Deputies Committee was a “grouping of the number-
two officials” in each department relevant to the proposed action; the Principals 
Committee was chaired by the National Security Advisor and included the heads 
of all relevant departments.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 107.  The finding itself was usually no more than two pages in 
length and contained the reason that the action was in the national interest, the 
foreign policy goals to be achieved, and scope of the proposed action.  Id. at    
109–10.  The supporting document was where the details of the operation were 
found.  Id. at 110. 
 94. Richard Clarke assessed and contrasted the different review habits of 
President Clinton and George W. Bush.  See RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL 
ENEMIES 243 (2004).  Clarke describes Clinton “plowing” through documents well 
past midnight and calling universities for additional information after exhausting 
the knowledge of his staff.  Id.  Clarke recounts that Bush, on the other hand, was 
“not a big reader,” received his briefings from a small group of senior advisers, and 
went to bed by 10:00 p.m.  Id. 
 95. Memorandum from George W. Bush (Feb. 13, 2001), http://www.fas. 
16
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appeared that the Bush Administration would continue the current 
trend of regimented oversight and approval for covert activity.  But 
the world changed dramatically just seven months after the signing 
of this directive and the focus shifted immediately to the securing 
of America’s borders from a new and evolving threat.  In the wake 
of the war on terror and the war in Iraq, little time has been spent 
analyzing exactly how the current Administration is authorizing the 
covert activity it deems necessary to confront these new conflicts.  
This section aims to shed some light on that policy and to illustrate 
the covert action approval process as it exists today. 
1. Pre-9/11 Covert Action Policy 
The Bush Administration’s process for authorizing covert 
action started to form before the attacks of September 11, 2001.  
The threat of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden was a fear 
communicated to the Bush Administration by Clinton holdovers 
such as National Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke.96  
The terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda eventually prompted 
President Bush to tell his top aides: “I want to take the fight to the 
terrorists.”97  After this general directive, the responsibility of asking 
the CIA to prepare plans for an expansive covert action plan to 
deter terrorist activities fell on President Bush’s new National 
Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice.98  Rice requested that the CIA 
“prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in 
Afghanistan” to deter the al Qaeda threat.99  This request, 
according to Rice, was based on a proposition by Richard Clarke 
and NSC senior director for intelligence Mary McCarthy.100 
                                                                                                             
org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm (National Security Presidential Directive-1, 
entitled Organization of the National Security System).  Bush eliminated the 
Interagency Working Groups and replaced them with a network of Policy 
Coordinating Committees (PCC).  DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 240–41 n.21. 
 96. CLARKE, supra note 94, at 227–32.  Clarke recounts telling Condoleezza 
Rice, Steven Hadley, Dick Cheney, and Colin Powell in January 2001 that al Qaeda 
was at war with the U.S. and that an appropriate offensive response to al Qaeda’s 
planned terrorist activities was necessary to U.S. security.  Id. at 227.  Clarke kept 
the title of National Counterterrorism Coordinator in the Bush Administration, 
but his authority was diminished and he was required to report to the Deputies 
Committee rather than directly to the Principals Committee.  9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 200. 
 97. Barton Gellman, A Strategy’s Cautious Evolution, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, 
at A1. 
 98. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 210. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  The idea of extended covert activity against terrorists in Afghanistan 
17
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The CIA came back to Rice and the NSC with options for 
covert action in Afghanistan, including the launching of an 
unmanned Predator drone operated by the CIA.101  This proposed 
covert action was discussed within the Deputies Committee upon its 
return to the White House, but technical issues with the drone kept 
the planned action from being launched.102  Because the project 
was never actually executed, a presidential finding was never signed 
and congressional notification never took place. 
This first example of the Bush Administration’s approval 
process for a covert action highlights some similarities to the 
process followed by previous administrations, but there are also 
some marked differences.  The general structure of the process 
appears to be similar to that of the Clinton Administration, with the 
directive to the CIA coming from the National Security Adviser by 
way of the President.103  The planning stages for the proposed 
Predator drone missions started with the CIA and were then passed 
back to the White House to undergo review by the NSC deputies 
and, eventually, by the principals.104 
A peculiar difference in the process appears to be the lack of 
direct involvement by the President in the initial tasking of the CIA 
to pursue the planning stages of covert activity.  The proposed 
missions against al Qaeda in Afghanistan were largely hatched 
during the previous administration, and it was the pitch of those 
plans (by Clinton holdovers) to National Security Adviser Rice that 
                                                                                                             
was in conjunction with an earlier strategic proposal to provide covert aid to the 
Northern Alliance in Afghanistan after fighting broke out in the country, as well as 
aid to Uzbekistan to achieve similar goals.  Id. at 202–03.  The peculiar part of 
Clarke’s involvement at this point in the process was the fact that he had 
essentially been demoted to a position subordinate to the deputies committee.  Id. 
at 200.  Involvement by an individual with this level of authority, at this point in 
the process, was rare in previous administrations.  Id.  See supra Parts III.A.–C.  See 
also CLARKE, supra note 94, at 230 (describing the change in the chain of 
command in the Bush administration and to whom Clarke was to report). 
 101. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 210–12.  The drone was a 
prototype produced by the Air Force for reconnaissance purposes.  CLARKE, supra 
note 94, at 220–22.  The Predator drone was developed to carry a Hellfire missile 
at the behest of the NSC and Department of Defense.  9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 211.  A debate also occurred as to whether the CIA would have the 
legal authority to operate the drone, equipped with a missile, to kill members of al 
Qaeda and still be in compliance with the assassination ban stated in Executive 
Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981).  9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
 102. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 212. 
 103. Id. at 202–12. 
 104. Id. 
18
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set the project in motion.105  As stated earlier, President Bush gave 
the general authorization to go on the offensive, but any further 
involvement by the President in the planning of the goals of the 
action appears limited.106 
Another characteristic of the Bush Administration’s covert 
action approach highlighted by this early activity was the expansive 
scope such actions were intended to take.  The growing 
momentum for an initiative against al Qaeda lead to the drafting of 
a National Security Presidential Directive, including extensive 
covert programs, in June 2001.107 
From the beginning, the Bush Administration planned to push 
the limits of what covert action was classically authorized to 
accomplish.  In September 2001, the CIA was told to draft new 
“legal authorities for the ‘broad covert action program’ envisioned 
by the draft presidential directive.”108  These new legal parameters 
were to include the “‘authority to capture or to use lethal force’ 
against al Qaeda.”109  This legal posturing was necessary in order to 
absolve the CIA from any liability based on the ban against 
assassinations in Executive Order 12,333.110  The Bush 
Administration intended to blur the lines of what could be 
accomplished through covert action as long as the legal authority 
could be found. 
2. The Post-9/11 Finding—A New Scope of Covert Action 
After dealing with the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President 
Bush assembled his “war council” at Camp David.111  This war 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 210; CLARKE, supra note 94, at 237–38. 
 106. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 202–12.  President Bush’s 
dependence on his cabinet for information and to make decisions is also 
highlighted by Vice President Dick Cheney’s attendance at NSC Principals 
meetings starting in January 2001 (something no previous vice president had ever 
done).  CLARKE, supra note 94, at 228.  Cheney was also appointed by President 
Bush in May 2001 to head a task force aimed at assessing terrorist threats and 
attacks by weapons of mass destruction.  9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 
204. 
 107. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 204. 
 108. Id. at 214. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,952 (Dec. 4, 1981) 
(stating in section 2.11 that “[n]o person employed by or acting on behalf of the 
United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
assassination”). 
 111. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 332.  President Bush’s war 
council consisted of Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor 
19
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council meeting set into motion the U.S. response to the al Qaeda-
led attacks on September 11, including an extensive covert action 
program.112  On September 17, 2001, the NSC convened in the 
White House and President Bush pushed his advisers to put the 
CIA into covert action operations immediately, stating, “I want to 
sign a finding today.  I want the CIA to be first on the ground.”113 
Acting on the President’s directive, Bush’s cabinet amended a 
pre-9/11 presidential directive for actions against al Qaeda into 
National Security Presidential Directive 9 (NSPD-9), entitled 
“Defeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.”114  This new 
directive expanded the previous directive to encompass a 
worldwide war on terrorism, not just activities against al Qaeda 
alone.115  Included in this directive was a presidential finding for 
covert action, drafted by the CIA and approved by CIA director 
George Tenet.116  The finding formally expanded the CIA’s power 
to include the use of lethal force against suspected terrorists when 
engaging in global counterterrorism activities.117  This finding 
                                                                                                             
Condoleezza Rice, Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, CIA Director George Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, 
and Cofer Black, Director, DCI Counterterrorism Center.  Id.  This meeting of the 
war council took place September 15–16, 2001.  Id. 
 112. Id.  CIA Director Geroge Tenet proposed inserting CIA teams into 
Afghanistan to work with opposition to the Taliban to try to find Osama bin Laden 
and fight against al Qaeda.  Id. 
 113. BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 97 (2002). 
 114. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 333.   
The NSPD called on the Secretary of Defense to plan for military options 
‘against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-
control, air and air defense, ground forces, and logistics.’ The NSPD also 
called for plans ‘against al Qida [sic] and associated terrorist facilities in 
Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control-communications, 
training, and logistics facilities.’ 
Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, Apr. 1, 2004, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2004/04/20040401-4.html#16.  Aside 
from the White House’s depiction of NSPD-9 and general testimony received by 
the 9/11 Commission, NSPD-9 is a classified document.  Federation of American 
Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, NSPD-9: Combating Terrorism, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-9.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007) 
[hereinafter FAS Intelligence Resource Program]. 
 115. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 333. 
 116. WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 76. 
 117. Id.  This presidential finding was not the first authorization of lethal force 
through covert action issued by a President.  President Clinton authorized the use 
of lethal force against al Qaeda in 1998.  Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs ‘Targeted 
Killing’ Missions; Administration Believes Restraints Do Not Bar Singling Out Individual 
20
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provided the CIA with the “broadest and most lethal authority in its 
history.”118 
The process leading to the final approval of the post-9/11 
covert action finding was relatively similar to the process followed 
by previous administrations.  First, the proposal of new covert 
activity was presented by the head of the CIA and expanded on a 
plan that had already been submitted for presidential approval on 
September 4, 2001.119  As discussed previously, the original proposal 
from the CIA was requested by National Security Advisor Rice after 
discussions with President Bush.120  Thus, the authority for 
researching and developing this plan for covert action started with 
a request from the White House.  The start of the process for 
approving the broad post-9/11 finding was, therefore, similar to 
the process followed in the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and 
Clinton Administrations.121 
Second, the plan for covert action and the proposed 
presidential finding were reviewed and approved by principals and 
deputies of the presidential cabinet.  But the review by the deputies 
and principals in this case occurred in a slightly different fashion.  
The approval of the finding signed by President Bush on 
September 17, 2001 only underwent the review of the war cabinet 
principals and their deputies during the Camp David briefings of 
September 15–16, 2001.122  It does not appear that the final finding 
                                                                                                             
Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2001, at A1. 
 118. WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 78.  The authority was viewed as broader 
than the force authorized by Clinton in 1998 because it expanded the CIA’s power 
to use lethal force in all aspects of a “secret global war on terror,” and not just 
against al Qaeda.  Id.  See also Gellman, supra note 117, at A1 (“Bush’s directive 
broadens the class of potential targets beyond bin Laden and his immediate circle 
of operational planners, and also beyond the present boundaries of the fight in 
Afghanistan, officials said.”).  The finding also allowed for the narrower planning 
of the death of an individual, something that had not been expressed in findings 
by previous presidents.  Id. 
 119. Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Prepared for 
Delivery to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(Mar. 23, 2004), at 7, http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/ 
rumsfeld_statement.pdf [hereinafter Rumsfeld Testimony]. 
 120. See supra Part III.D.1. 
 121. See supra Parts III.A.–C. 
 122. See WOODWARD, supra note 113, at 101.  The finding was actually included 
in a Memorandum of Notification which served to modify an intelligence finding 
on worldwide counterterrorism signed by President Reagan in 1986.  Id. at 76.  See 
also supra note 111 (listing the members of the war council).  The author could 
not find the actual title and number of the Reagan finding, likely a National 
Security Decision Directive (NSDD), probably because this document is still 
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was ever formally resubmitted to the Principals and Deputies 
Committees for comment (as was commonly the process for 
approval in previous administrations).  But given the abbreviated 
timeline created by 9/11 and the impromptu meeting of the war 
council, it is not surprising that this seemingly bureaucratic process 
of reconvening the Principals and Deputies Committees was not 
followed in this particular phase of the finding’s authorization.123 
The final statutory component of the covert action approval 
process, congressional notification, was less clear in this instance.  
President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and the 
American people on September 20, 2001, proclaiming that “covert 
operations, secret even in success” would be utilized to defeat the 
terrorist threat.124  After this point, if not before, the intent of the 
Bush administration to use covert action as a weapon against the 
terrorist threat was obvious.  But precisely when the appropriate 
members of Congress were notified of the confidential specifics of 
the planned covert activity is hard to determine.  Officials from the 
first four years of the Bush Administration have gone on record to 
say that congressional leaders were notified of approved covert 
actions within the required forty-eight-hour period specified by 
statute.125  At this point, there is no evidence leading to the 
conclusion that the Administration did not follow the proper 
congressional reporting procedures required by the National 
Security Act of 1947.126  It is unlikely that such a reporting violation 
occurred, given the scrutiny the Bush Administration has been 
                                                                                                             
classified.  See FAS Intelligence Resource Program, supra note 114, at http:// 
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (listing all known NSDDs of the 
Reagan Administration) (last visited October 31, 2006).  It appears that NSDD 217 
is a likely candidate; NSDD 217 is the only NSDD issued in 1986 that is still 
completely confidential, and no other listed titles allude to the nature of the 
described directive.  See id. 
 123. As already discussed, the presidential finding issued for covert activity 
after 9/11 was an addition and revision to NSPD-9, which had already gone 
through the standard approval process (including review by the principals and 
deputies committees).  See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 212–14; see 
also Rumsfeld Testimony, supra note 119, at 7 (stating that NSPD-9 had been 
researched, prepared, and submitted to the President for approval on September 
4, 2001). 
 124. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
 125. See James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Responses: Hunt for al Qaeda, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at A1. 
 126. See 50 U.S.C. § 413b (2000) (detailing proper congressional reporting 
procedures). 
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subject to with regard to pre- and post-9/11 national security 
activities. 
3. The Bush Covert Action Authorization Process Today 
Despite the structured process executed by the Bush 
Administration to authorize certain covert activity shortly after 
September 11, 2001, recent developments and investigative 
reporting have called into question the Administration’s continued 
use of this process.  Is all covert action planned and executed in the 
war on terror and the war in Iraq subject to the same layered 
analysis used in 2001? 
a. GST and the Use of Lethal Force 
The finding that President Bush signed on September 17, 2001 
has expanded into a broad-based covert action program known by 
the initials GST.127  The broad power granted to the CIA under the 
original finding has allowed the Administration, through extensive 
legal interpretation, to substantially increase the ability of GST 
operatives to engage in lethal activity against al Qaeda members in 
just about any part of the world.128  Due to the broad nature of the 
finding and the Administration’s interpretation of it, additional 
covert actions have been executed by the CIA without the need to 
seek further approval.129 
The elimination of the need to approve every covert activity is 
most evident in the execution of the Administration’s “high-value 
target list,” which authorizes the CIA to hunt down and kill specific 
terrorists.130  In authorizing this list and the lethal authority 
associated with it, President Bush “provided written legal authority 
                                                 
 127. Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 
2005, at A1.  GST “is an abbreviation of a classified code name for the umbrella 
covert action program” aimed at fighting the war on terror.  Id. 
 128. Id.  The Administration’s primary legal justification for its lethal acts is 
one of self-defense based on the resolution passed by Congress on September 14, 
2001, authorizing “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”  Id. (quoting the resolution). 
 129. Jonathan Ulrich, The Gloves Were Never On: Defining the President’s Authority 
to Order Targeted Killing in the War Against Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 1029, 1042–43 
(2005). 
 130. Risen & Johnston, supra note 125.  The target list includes roughly two 
dozen al Qaeda leaders, defined as the “worst of the worst,” including Osama bin 
Laden and his chief deputies.  Id. 
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to the CIA to hunt down and kill the terrorists without seeking 
further approval each time the agency is about to stage an 
operation.”131  Presumably, the written legal authority provided by 
the President was in the form of a presidential finding.  But it is 
unclear whether the written authority is in the original finding 
issued in 2001, or another finding that defines the particular act of 
hunting down and killing specific terrorists. 
Critics of the GST program are skeptical of the validity of the 
program’s legal justification, arguing that the Administration has 
essentially written itself a blank check “to do anything” in the war 
on terror.132  This wide-ranging power has given the CIA extensive 
power to execute covert actions without additional oversight, 
allegedly leading to extensive day-to-day decision making by the 
head of the CIA and others.133  The delegation of power has 
allegedly filtered down to the point where the Director of the CIA 
can pass the authority to execute killings against al Qaeda members 
to the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center.134 
The distribution of authority to lower ranks raises the question 
of whether covert actions executed under the GST program comply 
with statutory requirements.  When the National Security Act of 
1947 refers to the President’s authority to conduct “a covert 
action,”135 how broadly can such an action be construed?  Does 
each individual act need to be reported to Congress?136  Can the 
                                                 
 131. Id. 
 132. Priest, supra note 127, at A1. 
 133. Id.  According to congressional and intelligence officials, President Bush 
delegated much of the decision-making responsibility for covert actions, including 
targeted killings, to former CIA Director George Tenet.  Id. 
 134. Id.  One of the most controversial covert actions executed since 
September 2001 is the pilotless Predator drone missile strike in Yemen in 
November 2002 that killed an American citizen.  Priest, supra note 6, at A1.  The 
dissemination of power to those in lower-ranking CIA positions poses the question 
of whether the President had knowledge of this particular strike.  If he did not, 
would the strike have been executed if the President was the one giving the order 
to fire and knew of the presence of a U.S. citizen with the target? 
 135. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a) (2000). 
 136. Allegations have also been made that the Bush Administration limited the 
number of Congressional members informed of its covert plans to four: the 
chairmen and ranking Democratic members of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees.  Priest, supra note 127, at A1.  If this did occur, the administration 
would be in violation of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires, at 
minimum, that eight members of Congress be informed within forty-eight hours 
of the ordering of any covert action.  50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(2) (2000).   
If the President determines that it is essential to limit access to the finding to 
meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States, 
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authority to execute any particular action under a finding be 
granted to anyone but the President himself?  While the original 
finding for covert activity in 2001 was subject to an extensive review 
process, each individual action since the issuing of that finding 
appears to be subject to a decreasing standard of approval and 
review. 
b. The Iraq Elections 
A second situation eliciting questions about the Bush 
Administration’s process for approving covert activity is the 
suspicion that the United States secretly influenced Iraq’s first free 
elections in January 2005.  In the months leading up to the January 
30th election, President Bush approved a covert action plan to 
provide support to certain Iraqi candidates and political parties.137  
But this plan was met with considerable opposition starting in 
October 2004 when Congress was notified of the proposed 
finding.138  Certain members of Congress opposed any secret 
influence by the United States in the Iraq election because such 
activity would, in their view, obviously compromise the U.S. 
Government’s stated commitment to sponsoring a free, unfettered 
election.139  The President rescinded the proposed finding in light 
of the congressional opposition, but allegations have persisted that 
the Bush Administration went forward with its plan to influence the 
Iraq election by hiring “retired CIA officers and other non-
government personnel, and us[ing] funds that were not necessarily 
                                                                                                             
the finding may be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority 
members of the congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and 
minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and 
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or members of the 
congressional leadership as may be included by the President.  
Id. (emphases added). 
 137. Jehl & Sanger, supra note 5. 
 138. Id. Timothy J. Burger & Douglas Waller, Notebook: How Much U.S. Help?, 
TIME, Oct. 4, 2004, at 17. 
 139. Seymour M. Hersh, Get Out the Vote; Did Washington Try to Manipulate Iraq’s 
Election?, NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, at 52, 55; Jehl & Sanger, supra note 5.  House 
Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi was reported to be the most heated opponent of 
the planned election intervention.  Berger & Waller, supra note 138, at 17.  Pelosi 
allegedly had a heated phone conversation with then National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice, in which Pelosi stated, in essence, “‘Did we have eleven 
hundred Americans die’—the  number of U.S. combat deaths as of September 
2004—‘so [Iraq] could have a rigged election?’”  Hersh, supra, at 55; see also Jehl & 
Sanger, supra note 5. 
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appropriated by Congress.”140 
The original plan appears to have followed a method of review 
and approval similar to the Administration’s post-9/11 finding,141 
culminating in a submission of the finding to the appropriate 
congressional intelligence committees for review.  If an additional 
“off the books”142 plan was executed by third parties hired by the 
U.S. Government, such an action would be in direct violation of the 
National Security Act of 1947.143  Some members of the White 
House and Pentagon are reported to believe that when an 
operation is kept secret and “off the books,” the action is not 
official and therefore does not require the congressional 
notification used in regular covert actions.144  If this is a prevailing 
attitude within the current Administration and covert action was 
indeed executed in Iraq without credence to statutory regulations, 
this presents a disturbing trend.  If the executive branch can 
execute any covert activity it deems necessary as long as it finds an 
outside source through which to carry out its plans, important 
oversight and regulation provided by governmental checks and 
balances are lost. 
In summary, recent covert actions authorized by the Bush 
Administration appear to be creating a precedent of only a cursory 
review process for proposed activity.  The power to execute 
proposed actions is becoming further removed from the direct 
oversight of the President, and when the Administration finds 
opposition to its plans, it appears that the executive branch is 
simply creating ways to circumvent that opposition.  To ensure that 
the process leading to the approval of these very powerful actions is 
appropriately transparent and subject to proper scrutiny, certain 
changes should be made to the current system. 
                                                 
 140. Hersh, supra note 139, at 55. 
 141. See supra Part III.D.2.  But the exact approval process used before 
submission of the document to Congress has not been reported publicly. 
 142. Hersh, supra note 139, at 55. 
 143. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(a)(4) (2000) (“Each finding shall specify whether it is 
contemplated that any third party . . . will be used to fund or otherwise participate 
in any significant way in the covert action concerned . . . .”). 
 144. See Hersh, supra note 139, at 55 (reporting that “[s]ome in the White 
House and at the Pentagon believed that keeping an operation off the books 
eliminated the need to give a formal briefing to the relevant members of Congress 
and congressional intelligence committees, whose jurisdiction is limited, in their 
view, to officially sanctioned CIA operations”). 
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IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE COVERT ACTION APPROVAL PROCESS 
In his analysis of U.S. intelligence policies and safeguards 
against CIA abuses in 1989, long-time national security and political 
science scholar Loch Johnson opined: “Intelligence policy for the 
most part has become more of a partnership between the branches 
[of government] than ever before.  American democracy works 
best as a partnership among the branches of government and not 
through reliance on the executive branch alone.”145  Johnson’s 
assessment of the strengths of the American form of government is 
particularly prudent given the current state of affairs in the 
approval process for covert action.  The execution of covert action 
has become unequivocally dependent upon the executive branch 
alone, and changes need to be made to ensure that balance, 
transparency, and accountability return to this very powerful 
intelligence tool.  Two plausible ways to achieve these goals are an 
improved system of retrospective congressional review and better 
composition of the congressional intelligence committees. 
A. Retrospective and Independent Congressional Review 
For the power of the executive branch to be appropriately 
checked and for the will of the American people to be represented, 
Congress must play a crucial role in the process that governs the 
planning and implementation of covert actions.  But given the 
evolving nature of the threats against which the United States must 
protect its citizens, a more cumbersome preliminary approval 
process could severely infringe upon the President’s ability to react 
quickly and effectively to imminent dangers.  For this reason, and 
for reasons of congressional and executive efficiency, congressional 
oversight of the covert action process should be focused on 
retrospective analysis and judgment of executed covert actions.146 
In a great many cases, anticipated covert actions can undergo a 
thorough analysis and genuine democratic debate before their 
                                                 
 145. Johnson, supra note 50, at 389.  Johnson also quoted former Director of 
Central Intelligence William Colby as observing that “in the future, covert action 
mistakes ‘will be American mistakes.  They will not be CIA mistakes, but mistakes 
of the administration and the Congress in power.’”  Id. at 388–89. 
 146. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 143.  Reisman and Baker also 
postulated that “[c]overt actions . . . require an executive . . . [b]ut democracies 
also require that executive actions be subjected to oversight and appraisal.”  Id. 
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implementation.147  This is one of the reasons that the requirement 
of congressional notification before execution of a covert action 
exists in federal statute148 and can only be delayed or limited in 
“extraordinary circumstances.”149  But in the current environment 
of terrorist threats, the United States and its chief executive must 
operate under an ever-changing timeline to combat an enemy that 
President Bush characterized as one “that lurks and plots and plans 
and wants to hurt America again.”150  To meet this new and evolving 
threat, every effort should be made by the President and his 
cabinet to inform Congress of planned covert activity, but it is 
unrealistic to think that each and every action will be open to 
debate.  The effectiveness of many covert actions in the war on 
terror will be based on the ability to execute the actions quickly and 
without significant bureaucratic delay. 
It is therefore vitally important that Congress, specifically the 
congressional intelligence committees, focus their energies on 
evaluating covert actions after they have occurred or during their 
execution.  Through thorough retrospective evaluations and 
recommendations, perceived mistakes or abuses related to covert 
activity can be evaluated and changes can be made in the future.  
According to William Daugherty, former chief of the Covert Action 
[policy] Group in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations,151 from the 
Reagan Administration through the Clinton Administration, there 
was an extensive congressional review process of all covert 
actions.152  But it is unclear whether this process gave any significant 
power to the congressional committees to hold the executive 
                                                 
 147. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 390 (stating that “[i]n ninety-nine percent 
of [the] cases the democratic safeguards of prior debate, consultation, established 
procedures, and close monitoring [of intelligence actions] can be honored”).  But 
Johnson wrote his article in 1989, well before the advent of the current war on 
terrorism.  It may be naïve to say that almost all actions can be subject to this level 
of debate and review, but the basic premise of the statement still has modern 
validity. 
 148. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(b)(1) (2000). 
 149. Id. § 413b(c)(2)–(3). 
 150. See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 8, 2005, at A15. 
 151. University Press of Kentucky: Biography of William J. Daugherty, 
http://www.kentuckypress.com/PRdaugherty_bio.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2007). 
 152. See DAUGHERTY, supra note 13, at 107 (listing multiple steps in the review 
process).  Daugherty states that annual and quarterly reviews were made by the 
congressional intelligence committees of all covert actions both planned and in 
operation.  Id.  Daugherty also recounts that the congressional committees could 
request a briefing on any action at any time and that such requests “number[ed] 
literally in the hundreds every year.”  Id. 
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branch accountable for perceived abuses of power.  It is also 
questionable whether such a review process is still used extensively 
today. 
An effective retrospective review process would undoubtedly 
include an extensive review of the legal aspects surrounding 
already executed covert actions and actions currently in process.  
This legal analysis would be most effective and unbiased if it were 
to come from lawyers not closely connected to the executive 
branch or closely affiliated with any particular political party.153  In 
the Bush Administration, the legal analysis of intelligence activities 
tends to come from lawyers within the administration who 
maneuver around dissenting opinions rather than providing an 
objective, measured analysis.154  By implementing and executing a 
more independent and retrospective congressional review process, 
the legal justifications provided by the current Administration can 
be checked without unduly hindering the ability of the executive 
branch to protect the American people. 
B. Composition of the Congressional Intelligence Committees 
The power and responsibility to review covert action plans rests 
with the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.155  
The importance of secrecy in covert activities requires that only a 
limited number of members of Congress are kept informed of the 
specifics and status of planned actions.156  For these committees to 
be effective in their review of covert action plans and other 
intelligence information, it is essential that the senators and 
representatives on these committees have adequate background on 
                                                 
 153. See generally REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 12, at 141–42 (proposing the use 
of lawyers with appropriate backgrounds in international law, but outside the 
“chain of command” of the executive branch in assessing the legality of covert 
actions abroad). 
 154. See Priest, supra note 127, at A1 (quoting William Mitchell College of Law 
Professor A. John Radsan, a former CIA lawyer, who described the Bush 
Administration’s “inner circle of lawyers and advisers work[ing] around the 
dissenters in the Administration,” rather than having “a broad debate on whether 
commander-in-chief powers can trump international conventions and domestic 
statutes in our struggle against terrorism”). 
 155. Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 27, 2004, at A1.  See also supra Part II.C (describing the creation of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and their purposes). 
 156. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(1) (2000) (prescribing requirements for the 
President to promptly report covert actions to congressional intelligence 
committees). 
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the matters submitted for their review. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, criticism has surfaced with regard to 
the ability of the congressional intelligence committees to perform 
their responsibilities.157  Loch Johnson describes the oversight by 
the committees as “by and large feckless and episodic.”158  The 
deterioration in the committees’ abilities has been linked to two 
main factors.  First, the complexity and volume of intelligence 
information, including covert action, has increased substantially.159  
Committee members are inundated with immediate concerns and 
daily briefings and little time remains for the broader duties of 
analysis and review of proposed actions.160  Second, eight-year term 
limits exist for all intelligence committee members.161  Committee 
members and outside experts say these term limits severely hinder 
the members’ ability to develop a firm understanding of the very 
complex world of intelligence.162  The learning curve for gaining an 
adequate grasp on the inner workings of the CIA and other 
intelligence agencies is apparently quite steep, and it is made 
steeper by a passive resistance from the agencies to requests to 
relinquish certain information.163  The result is two committees that 
are under-experienced and ill-equipped to effectively execute all of 
the duties assigned to them. 
In order for the congressional intelligence committees to serve 
effectively in the role of retrospective analyst and as a check on the 
powers of the executive branch, the members of these committees 
must be exceptionally capable.164  Any power delegated to these 
committees becomes useless if those using the power are spending 
the majority of their time simply trying to understand intelligence 
information, rather than applying a broader analysis.165  Covert 
                                                 
 157. See generally Priest, supra note 155, at A1. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  One former committee member, Timothy J. Roemer (D–Ind.), said 
the committees’ role in oversight and investigation “has almost gone away,” 
because committee members are “so busy with the budget and keeping up with 
daily events.”  Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  Senator Mike DeWine (R–Ohio), Representative Porter J. Goss       
(R–Fla.), and “most other members of both [intelligence] committees say the term 
limits should be abolished, at least for some members.”  Id. 
 163. Id.  The description of a steep learning curve and passive resistance came 
from Senate Select Committee on Intelligence member Senator Mike DeWine  
(R–Ohio).  Id. 
 164. See generally id. 
 165. See generally id. 
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actions are often executed quickly.  Any hope of the intelligence 
committees providing an additional voice to the process is 
completely dependent upon having members who are well versed 
in the specifics of intelligence operations. 
To assure that the Senate and House intelligence committees 
are better equipped to handle a new and evolving era of 
intelligence, Congress should make certain changes.  First, 
Congress should consider eliminating, or at least lengthening, term 
limits for members of these committees.166  Eliminating term limits 
does pose the risk of entrenched thinking and lower turnover.  But 
given the complexity of the issues involved, this risk is most likely 
outweighed by the additional experience and discretion provided 
by longer-term members.  Second, Congress should consider 
increasing the number of people involved in the intelligence 
committees.  This does not necessarily mean adding additional 
members of Congress.  At present, members of the House and 
Senate intelligence committees do not have staffers available to 
help them synthesize the great amounts of complex information 
with which they must keep current.167  This is obviously due to 
confidentiality concerns, but perhaps it is time to consider lowering 
the overall work load in order to assure a greater level of 
understanding and analysis. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current state of U.S. foreign affairs, especially in the 
Middle East and Eastern Europe, leads to the conclusion that 
covert action will continue to be an important tool for the United 
States in combating a unique and ever-evolving enemy.  The 
success of covert actions is undeniably linked to an effective policy 
of confidentiality to assure that planned actions are not 
compromised and can have the maximum effect on the intended 
target. 
But as with any governmentally funded activity, covert actions 
must be executed with the interests and priorities of the American 
public in mind.  The responsibility for ensuring that the executive 
branch makes decisions aligned with public sentiment naturally 
falls on members of the legislative branch.  The congressional 
committees on intelligence must be composed of capable, 
                                                 
 166. See generally id. See also supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 167. Priest, supra note 155, at A1. 
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knowledgeable, and experienced senators and representatives with 
the ability to assess the immediate and future impacts of America’s 
covert actions.  The members of these committees are the key to 
providing a regulatory component to a covert action planning 
process that will continue to change and evolve with each new 
conflict and every new administration. 
To think that a standard, regimented, and completely 
transparent process could be demanded of the executive branch 
for approving and executing covert action is naïve.  The current 
state of national affairs requires that the President have the latitude 
to act in the best interests of national security.168  It is possible, 
however, to impress our republican form of government upon the 
covert action process by ensuring a measured system of checks and 
balances for even this most secretive of government activities. 
 
 
                                                 
 168. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001). 
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